




he standard view of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy
assigns a key role to long-term interest rates. According to this view,
a monetary policy tightening pushes up both short and long interest
rates, leading to less spending by interest-sensitive sectors of the economy and
therefore to lower real growth. Conversely, a monetary easing results in lower
interest rates that stimulate real growth. An open question in discussions of this
view is whether monetary policy has signiﬁcant empirical effects on long-term
interest rates.1
In this article, I provide new evidence on the quantitative effect of mon-
etary policy on the long-term interest rate. The federal funds rate is used as
a measure of monetary policy.2 The work extends the previous research in
The author thanks Peter Ireland, Roy Webb, and Marvin Goodfriend for their many helpful
comments. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent
those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 In most previous studies using an interest-rate-based measure of monetary policy, a short-
term money market rate (the three-month or one-year Treasury bill rate) is used. Most of those
studies surveyed recently in Akhtar (1995) ﬁnd signiﬁcant and large effects of short rates on
long rates. In those studies the long-run response of nominal long rates ranges from about 22 to
66 basis points for every one percentage point change in nominal short rates. However, there is
considerable skepticism about the reliability and interpretation of those effects. One main reason
for such skepticism is even though monetary policy has its strongest effect on a short-term money
market rate, the latter is also inﬂuenced by nonmonetary forces. Hence changes in short rates do
not necessarily reﬂect changes in the stance of monetary policy.
There are a few other empirical studies that use the federal funds rate as a measure of mone-
tary policy. But most of those studies examine the effect of policy on the long rate in a bivariable
framework. In such studies the estimated impact of policy on the long rate is quantitatively modest
and temporally unstable (see Akhtar 1995, Table 3). An exception is the recent work in Mehra
(1994) which uses a multivariable framework and ﬁnds a signiﬁcant effect of the real funds rate
on the long rate. However, Mehra (1994) does not investigate the robustness of those results to
alternative speciﬁcations or to different sample periods.
2 Recent research has shown that the federal funds rate is a good indicator of the stance of
monetary policy (Bernanke and Blinder 1992; Bernanke and Mihov 1995).
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two main directions. First, following Goodfriend’s (1993) description of funds
rate policy actions, it distinguishes empirically between the long- and short-run
sources of interaction between the funds rate and the long rate; this distinction
is absent in previous studies. Second, the analysis in Goodfriend also suggests
that the near-term effects of funds rate policy actions on the long rate may be
quite variable. Hence the work examines the temporal stability of such effects,
an issue also virtually ignored in previous research.
The empirical work focuses on the behavior of the nominal yield on ten-
year U.S. Treasury bonds during the period 1957Q1 to 1995Q2. The results
here indicate that the bond rate moves positively with the funds rate in the
long run. However, this comovement arises because the bond rate automati-
cally moves with trend inﬂation (the Fisher relation) and the Federal Reserve
(Fed) keeps the level of the funds rate in line with the going trend rate of
inﬂation (the long-run Fed reaction function). Apart from the correlation that
occurs through the inﬂation channel, I ﬁnd that empirically there is no other
source of long-run interaction between the bond rate and the funds rate. This
result arises because the bond rate’s other component—the expected long real
rate—is mean stationary and therefore unrelated to the level of the funds rate in
the long run. These results have the policy implication that monetary policy can
permanently lower the bond rate only by lowering the trend rate of inﬂation.
The short-run stance of monetary policy is measured by the spread between
the funds rate and the trend rate of inﬂation (the funds rate spread). The results
indicate that movements in the funds rate spread have a statistically signiﬁcant
effect on the bond rate and that the magnitude of its near-term effect on the
bond rate has increased signiﬁcantly since 1979.3 In the pre-1979 period, the
bond rate rose anywhere from 14 to 29 basis points whenever the funds rate
spread widened by one percentage point. In the post-1979 period, however, the
estimate of its near-term response ranges from 26 to 50 basis points.
The short-run results thus suggest that, ceteris paribus, a monetary policy
tightening measured by an increase in the funds rate spread does result in higher
bond rates in the short run, in line with the traditional view of the transmission
mechanism. However, this increase in the short-run sensitivity of the bond
rate to policy actions may itself be due to the way the Fed has conducted its
monetary policy since 1979. The Fed’s post-1979 efforts to bring down the
trend rate of inﬂation, coupled with lack of credibility, may have ampliﬁed the
near-term effects of funds rate changes on the bond rate.
3 In this article near-term effects refer to responses of the bond rate to recent past values of
the funds rate spread. The immediate effect is the response to the one-period lagged value of the
spread and the near-term effect is the cumulative response to all such past values. What I call the
near-term effect is sometimes referred to as the long-run effect in previous studies. As indicated
later, I use the long-run effect to measure the effect that arises from the existence of equilibrium
or trending relationships among nonstationary variables.Y. P. Mehra: Monetary Policy and Long-Term Interest Rates 29
The plan of this article is as follows. Section 1 presents the methodology
that underlies the empirical work, Section 2 contains empirical results, and
concluding observations are in Section 3.
1. THE MODEL AND THE METHOD
This section describes the methodology that underlies the empirical work in
this article.
The Fisher Relation, the Bond Rate, and the Federal Funds Rate
In order to motivate the empirical work, I ﬁrst describe how monetary policy
may affect the bond rate in the short run and the long run.4 As indicated before,
the federal funds rate is used as a measure of the stance of monetary policy.
Thus a monetary policy action is deﬁned as a change in the funds rate, and
a monetary policy strategy is deﬁned as the reaction function that would lead
to policy actions. The Fisher relation for interest rates provides a convenient
framework within which effects of policy actions can be described. The Fisher
relation is
BRt = rre
t + ˙ pe
t, (1)
where BRt is the bond rate, rre
t is the expected long real rate, and ˙ pe
t is the
expected long-term inﬂation rate. Equation (1) relates the bond rate to expec-
tations of inﬂation and the real rate.
The Fisher relation indicates that policy actions could conceivably affect
the bond rate by altering expectations of inﬂation, the real rate, or both. Since
policy actions may not always move the real rate and inﬂation components
in the same direction, the near-term responses of the bond rate to such ac-
tions cannot be determined a priori. Much may depend upon the nature of the
strategy being pursued by the Fed. Goodfriend (1993) discusses three different
strategies that may lie at the source of interaction between the bond rate and the
funds rate. Consider, ﬁrst, pure cyclical strategies in which the Fed routinely
raises (lowers) the funds rate in response to cyclical expansions (downturns)
without attempting to affect the current trend rate of inﬂation expected by the
public. Under that strategy, a funds rate increase will tend to raise the bond
rate by raising current and expected future short real rates (i.e., by raising the
rre
t component in [1]). This cyclical comovement is short run in nature.
The second strategy discussed by Goodfriend considers the response of the
Fed to an exogenous change in the trend rate of inﬂation. If the trend rate of
inﬂation increases, the bond rate automatically moves with inﬂation (equation
4 The discussion in this section draws heavily from Goodfriend (1993).30 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
[1]). The Fed may choose to keep the short real rate steady and will therefore
move the funds rate in line with the rising or falling inﬂation rate. In this case
the bond rate comoves with the funds rate because the Fed is responding to
changing inﬂation in a neutral fashion. I refer to this source of comovement as
long run in nature.
Finally, consider an aggressive strategy that could be taken either to pro-
mote real growth or to reduce the going trend rate of inﬂation. Under that
strategy, the net impact of policy actions on the bond rate is complex because
they can move the real rate (rre
t) and the inﬂation expectations (˙ pe
t) in opposite
directions. The real rate effect moves the bond rate in the same direction as
the funds rate, while the inﬂation effect moves the bond rate in the opposite
direction. Thus the net effect of policy actions on the long rate cannot be
determined a priori.
To illustrate, consider an aggressive increase in the funds rate intended to
reduce the trend rate of inﬂation. Such a tightening can shift both components
of the bond rate. If the Fed’s disinﬂation policy is credible, then short rates
rise and expected inﬂation falls. The fall in expected inﬂation may thus offset
somewhat the immediate response of the bond rate to the funds rate. If the
decline in expected inﬂation persists, then the Fed may soon bring down the
funds rate consistent with the lower trend rate of inﬂation. However, if the
public does not yet have full conﬁdence in the Fed’s disinﬂation, then the Fed
may have to persist with a sufﬁciently high funds rate until real growth slows
and inﬂation actually declines. In this case, the immediate and near-term effects
of the funds rate on the bond rate may be large relative to the previous case.
These policy actions generate correlations between the bond rate and the funds
rate which are both short and long run in nature.
Empirical Speciﬁcations of the Bond Rate Regressions:
Short- and Long-Run Effects
The discussion in the previous section suggests the following observations.
First, the bond rate may be correlated with current and past values of the funds
rate, but the strength and duration of that correlation is a matter for empirical
analysis.5 Second, the correlation between the funds rate and the bond rate
induced by pure cyclical and/or aggressive policy actions is likely to be short
run, appearing over business cycle periods. In contrast, the correlation induced
by the Fed’s reaction to shifts in the trend rate of inﬂation may be long run.
A rise in the trend rate of inﬂation that permanently raises the bond rate will
5 This lag arises not because ﬁnancial markets adjust slowly but rather because funds rate
strategy puts considerable persistence in the funds rate. Such a lag can also arise if the bond rate
depends upon anticipated policy moves which in turn are inﬂuenced partly by current and past
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also result in a higher funds rate if the Fed is trying not to induce any cyclical
or aggressive element into its policy. Third, other economic factors such as
inﬂation, the deﬁcit, or the state of the economy may also inﬂuence the bond
rate. Such correlations are apart from the one induced by monetary policy
actions.
Given the above-noted considerations, the empirical work here examines
the relationship between the bond rate and the funds rate in a multivariable
framework. The other economic determinants included in the analysis are the
actual inﬂation rate and the output gap that measures the cyclical state of the
economy.6 The work identiﬁes the short- and long-run sources of correlation be-
tween the funds rate and the bond rate using cointegration and error-correction
methodology. In particular, I proceed under the assumption, whose validity I
do examine, that levels of the empirical measures of the long rate, the inﬂation
rate, the funds rate, and other economic determinants each have unit roots
(stochastic trends) and that there may exist cointegrating relationships among
these variables. I interpret cointegrating regressions as measuring the long-run
equilibrium correlations and error-correction regressions as measuring short-run
correlations among variables.
To illustrate, assume that we are examining the interaction between the
bond rate and the funds rate in a system that also includes inﬂation. Assume
further that tests for cointegration indicate the presence of the following two
cointegrating regressions in the system:
BRt = a0 + a1˙ pt + U1t,a1 = 1, and (2)
NFRt = b0 + b1˙ pt + U2t,b1 = 1, (3)
where BRt is the bond rate, ˙ pt is actual inﬂation, NFR is the nominal funds rate,
and U1t and U2t are two stationary disturbances. Equation (2) indicates that the
bond rate moves one-for-one with inﬂation and that the long real rate is mean
stationary. Equation (3) indicates that the funds rate moves one-for-one with
inﬂation and that the real funds rate is mean stationary. These two cointegrating
regressions are consistent with the presence of long-run equilibrium correla-
tions between variables. If in the cointegrating regression, say, equation (2),
6 This framework differs somewhat from the ones used in Goodfriend (1993) and Mehra
(1994). Goodfriend describes interactions between the bond rate and the funds rate, taking into
account the behavior of actual inﬂation and real growth, whereas in Mehra (1994) the deﬁcit also
is included. That work, however, indicates that the deﬁcit variable is not a signiﬁcant determinant
of the bond rate once we control for the inﬂuences of inﬂation and real growth. Hence the deﬁcit
variable is excluded from the work here. I use the output gap rather than real growth as a measure
of the state of the economy because the bond rate appears more strongly correlated with the former
than with the latter. The qualitative nature of results, however, is the same whether the output
gap or real growth is used as a measure of the state of the economy. Moreover, I do examine
the sensitivity of results to some changes in speciﬁcation in the subsection entitled “Additional
Empirical Results.”32 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
˙ pt is weakly exogenous, then the long-run correlation can be given a causal
interpretation, implying that the bond rate is determined by the (trend) rate
of inﬂation.7 The hypothesis that inﬂation is weakly exogenous in (2) can be
tested by examining whether in regressions (4) and (5)














where δ1 6= 0 but δ2 = 0.8 That result indicates that it is the bond rate, not
inﬂation, that adjusts in response to deviations in the long-run relationship.
The cointegrating regressions discussed above identify the long-run co-
movements among variables. In order to estimate the short-run responses of
the bond rate to the funds rate, the empirical work uses the following error-
correction model of the bond rate:










d3∆˙ Pt−s + ²t, (6)
where all variables are as deﬁned before and where ∆ is the ﬁrst difference
operator. U1t−1 and U2t−1 are one-period lagged values of the residuals from
the cointegrating regressions. If we substitute for U1t and U2t from (2) and (3)
into (6), we can rewrite (6) as in (7):










d3s∆˙ pt−s + ²t, (7)
where ˜ d = d0 − λ1a0 − λ2b0. The short-run regression (7) includes levels as
well as differences of variables. The empirical effects of changes in the inﬂation
rate and the funds rate on the bond rate may occur through two distinct chan-
nels. First, those changes may affect the bond rate directly by altering future
expectations of the inﬂation rate and the real rate of interest. The parameters
dis, i = 2, 3, s = 0, n, measure near-term responses of the bond rate to changes
7 The concept of weak exogeneity is introduced by Engle et al. (1983). The hypothesis that
inﬂation is weakly exogenous with respect to the parameters of the cointegrating vector simply
means that inferences on such parameters can be efﬁciently carried out without specifying the
marginal distribution of inﬂation. More intuitively, inﬂation in equation (2) could be considered
predetermined in analyzing the response of the bond rate to inﬂation.
8 This test is proposed in Johansen (1992).Y. P. Mehra: Monetary Policy and Long-Term Interest Rates 33
in its economic determinants. But, as noted before, signs and magnitudes of
those parameters are a matter for empirical analysis because they depend upon
factors such as the strategy of policy actions, the credibility of the Fed, and
the nature of persistence in data. Lagged values of changes in the bond rate
are included in order to capture better its own short-run dynamics.
The second focuses on disequilibrium in the long-run relations which may
be caused by changes in the inﬂation rate and the funds rate. For example,
aggressive funds rate changes taken to affect real growth or inﬂation may
result in the level of the funds rate that is out of line with its value determined
by the long-run equilibrium relation (NFRt
<
> b0 + ˙ pt in [3]). Such short-run
disequilibrium can also occur if the Fed adjusts the funds rate with lags in
response to rising or falling inﬂation. Similarly, even though the bond rate
moves automatically with inﬂation, short-run inﬂuences from other economic
factors may result in the level of the bond rate that is out of line with its
long-run equilibrium value (Rt
<
> a0 + ˙ pt in [2]). Such transitory perturbations
in long-run equilibrium relations may have consequences for short-run changes
in the bond rate. The parameters λ1 and λ2 in (7) thus measure the responses
of the bond rate to such disequilibrium. The expected sign for λ1 is negative,
because the presence of the error-correction mechanism implies that the bond
rate should decline (increase) if it is above (below) its long-run equilibrium
value. In contrast, the sign of λ2 is expected to be positive. But note all these
disequilibrium effects are short-run (cyclical) in nature because in the long run
(deﬁned here in the equilibrium sense) they disappear and the bond rate is at
its long-run equilibrium value determined by (2), i.e., a0 + ˙ pt.
Data and Estimation Procedures
The empirical work in this article focuses on the behavior of the long rate
during the sample period from 1957Q1 to 1995Q2. The long rate is measured
by the nominal yield on ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds (BR). In most previous
studies a distributed lag on the actual inﬂation rate is used as proxy for the
long-run anticipated inﬂation, and actual inﬂation is generally measured by the
behavior of the consumer price index. I also use actual inﬂation as proxy for
anticipated inﬂation. I, however, measure inﬂation as the average of change
in the consumer price index, excluding food and energy, over the past three
years (˙ p).9 The output gap (gaph) is the natural log of real GDP minus the
9 I get similar results if instead the consumer price index or the GDP deﬂator is used to
measure actual inﬂation (see the subsection entitled “Additional Empirical Results”).
In a couple of recent studies (Hoelscher 1986; Mehra 1994) the Livingston survey data on
one-year-ahead inﬂationary expectations are used to measure long-run anticipated inﬂation. The
results in Mehra (1994), however, indicate that the near-term impact of the funds rate on the bond
rate remains signiﬁcant if one-year-ahead expected inﬂation (Livingston) data are substituted for
actual inﬂation in the empirical work (see Mehra 1994, Table 4). That result continues to hold in
this article also (see the subsection entitled “Additional Empirical Results”).34 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
log of potential GDP, which is generated using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. The
interest rates are monthly averages for the last month of the quarter.
The stationarity properties of the data are examined using tests for unit root
and mean stationarity. The unit root test used is the augmented Dickey-Fuller
test and the test for mean stationarity is the one in Kwiatkowski et al. (1992).
The test used for cointegration is the one proposed in Johansen and Juselius
(1990).10
2. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
In this section I describe cointegration test results for a system that includes
the bond rate (BR), the inﬂation rate (˙ p), and the nominal funds rate (NFR).
I also discuss short-run results from error-correction regressions for the full
sample period as well as for several subperiods. The section concludes with an
explanation of different pre- and post-1979 sample results.
Cointegration Test Results
Test results for unit roots and mean stationarity are summarized in the appendix.
They indicate that the bond rate (BR), the inﬂation rate (˙ p), and the nominal
funds rate (NFR) each have a unit root and thus contain stochastic trends. The
output gap variable by construction is stationary.
Test results for cointegration are also summarized in the appendix. I ﬁrst
focus on the bivariable systems (BR, ˙ p), (NFR, ˙ p), and (BR,NFR). Test results
are consistent with the presence of cointegration between variables in each
system, indicating that the bond rate is cointegrated with the inﬂation rate and
the funds rate. The funds rate is also cointegrated with the inﬂation rate. Thus
the bond rate comoves with each of these nonstationary variables, including
the funds rate.
The presence of cointegration between two variables simply means that
there exists a long-run stochastic correlation between them. In order to help
determine whether such correlation can be given a causal interpretation, Table
1 presents test results for weak exogeneity of the long-run parameters. In the
system (BR, ˙ p) inﬂation is weakly exogenous but the bond rate is not, indicating
that it is the bond rate that adjusts in response to deviations in the long-run
relationship. Thus the long-run equilibrium relationship between the bond rate
and the inﬂation rate can be interpreted as a Fisher relation in which the
bond rate is determined by the (trend) rate of inﬂation. In the system (NFR, ˙ p)
inﬂation is again weakly exogenous but the funds rate is not. Here again the
long-run relation can be interpreted as one in which the inﬂation rate drives
the interest rate: in this case the short-term rate. Hence, I interpret the long-run
10 These tests are described in Mehra (1994).Y. P. Mehra: Monetary Policy and Long-Term Interest Rates 35








(t-value) in Equations for
∆BR ∆ ˙ p p ∆NFR
1 BRt = 3.3 + 0.93 ˙ pt + U1t −0.18 −0.01
(10.0) (3.4) (0.6)
2 BRt = 1.2 + 0.91 NFRt + U2t −0.17 0.21
(50.7) (2.5) (1.5)
3 NFRt = 1.8 + 1.1 ˙ pt + U3t 0.00 −0.27
(6.2) (0.4) (3.2)




Notes: Cointegrating regressions given in panel A above are estimated by the dynamic OLS
procedure given in Stock and Watson (1993), using leads and lags of ﬁrst differences of the
relevant right-hand side explanatory variables. Eight leads and lags are included. Parentheses that
appear below coefﬁcients in cointegrating regressions contain t-values corrected for the presence
of moving average serial correlation. The order of serial correlation was determined by examining
the autocorrelation function of the residuals. χ2
1 is the Chi-square statistic that tests the hypothesis
that the coefﬁcient that appears on NFR in equation 4 is zero.
Panel B above contains error-correction coefﬁcients from regressions of the form














where Ut−1 is the lagged value of the residual from the cointegrating regression that is of the
form
X1t = d0 + d1X2t + Ut,
and where X1t and X2t are the pertinent nonstationary variables. The relevant cointegrating re-
gressions are given in panel A above. Parentheses that appear below error-correction coefﬁcients
contain t-values.
equilibrium relationship between the funds rate and the inﬂation rate as a kind
of reaction function.
The test results for weak exogeneity discussed above for systems (BR, ˙ p)
and (NFR, ˙ p) also imply that inﬂation causes the comovement between the bond
rate and funds rate. The bond rate comoves with the funds rate because the
bond rate moves automatically with inﬂation and the Fed keeps the funds rate
in line with the trend rate of inﬂation in the long run.36 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The analysis above, based on bivariable systems, thus suggests that in the
Fisher relation the funds rate should not be correlated with the bond rate once
we control for the correlation that is due to inﬂation. I test this implication
by examining whether the ex post real rate (BR − ˙ p) is correlated with the
funds rate. I do so by expanding the Fisher relation to include the funds rate
while maintaining the Fisher restriction that the bond rate adjusts one-for-one
with inﬂation. In that regression the funds rate is not signiﬁcant (see Table 1,
equation 4). The Chi-square statistic for the null hypothesis that the ex post real
rate is not correlated with the funds rate is small, consistent with no correlation.
The result that the bond rate is cointegrated with the actual inﬂation rate
and thus the ex post real rate (Rt−˙ pt) is stationary also implies that the expected
long real rate is stationary. This can be seen if we express the Fisher relation
(1) as
BRt − ˙ pt = rre
t + (˙ pe
t − ˙ pt) = rre
t + Ut,
where all variables are deﬁned as before and where Ut is the disturbance term.
This disturbance arises because the long-term expected inﬂation rate may dif-
fer from the three-year inﬂation rate. As is clear, the stationarity of (BRt − ˙ pt)
implies the stationarity of the expected long real rate.
Error-Correction Regressions
Since the ex ante long real rate is mean stationary, not constant, cyclical and
aggressive funds rate changes discussed before may still affect the bond rate
by altering expectations of its real rate and inﬂation components. I now explore
those short-run effects by estimating the error-correction equation.
The empirical results discussed in the previous section are consistent with
the following two cointegrating relationships:
BRt = a0 + a1˙ pt + U1t and (8)
NFRt = b0 + b1˙ pt + U2t. (9)
Equation (8) is the Fisher relation, and equation (9) the Fed reaction function.
The latter captures that component of the funds rate that comoves with trend
inﬂation. The residual U2t is then the component that captures the stance of
cyclical and aggressive funds rate policy actions. Consider then the following
error-correction equation:
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The parameter λ2 in (10) measures the response of the bond rate to the lagged
value of the funds rate spread (NFR − b0 − b1˙ p). Since the short-run equation
is in ﬁrst differences, the near-term response of the bond rate to the funds rate
spread can be calculated as −λ2/λ1.11 Also, equation (10) includes only lagged
values of economic determinants and hence can be estimated by ordinary least
squares. In order to examine subsample variability, I estimate equations (8)
through (10) over several sample periods, all of which begin in 1961Q2 but
end in different years from 1972 through 1995.
Table 2 presents some key coefﬁcients (λ1,λ2,−λ2/λ1,a1,b1) from these
regressions. If we focus on full sample results, then it can be seen that all these
key coefﬁcients appear with expected signs and are statistically signiﬁcant. In
cointegrating regressions the bond rate adjusts one-for-one with inﬂation and so
does the funds rate. The hypotheses that a1 = 1 and b1 = 1 cannot be rejected
and thus are consistent with our priors about the interpretation of (8) as the
Fisher relation and of (9) as the Fed reaction function. In the error-correction
regression λ2 is positive and its estimated value indicates a one percentage
point rise in the funds rate spread raises the bond rate by 13 basis points in the
following period. The net increase totals 42 basis points. The mean lag (−1/λ1)
in the short-run effect of the funds rate spread on the bond rate is approximately
3.2 quarters, indicating that these near-term responses dissipate quite rapidly.12
11 This can be shown as follows. Assume, for example, the level of the bond rate is related
to inﬂation and the funds rate spread as in
BRt = a0 + a1˙ pt + a2(NFR − b1˙ p)t + Vt, (a)
where the stationary component is a0 +a2(NFR−b1˙ p)t and the nonstationary component is a1˙ pt.
The error-correction regression is
∆BRt = λ1Vt−1 +
n X
s=1
(other lagged differences of variables) + ²t, (b)
where λ1 is negative. Substituting for Vt−1 from (a) into (b) yields (c):
∆BRt = λ1BRt−1 − λ1a1˙ pt−1 − λ1a2(NFR − b1˙ p)t−1 + other terms. (c)
Equation (c) can be estimated and a2 can be recovered as λ1a2/λ1, which is the minus of the
coefﬁcient on (NFR − b1˙ p)t−1 divided by the coefﬁcient on BRt−1. The coefﬁcient a2 then
measures the near-term response of the bond rate to the funds rate spread. I do not label a2 as
measuring the long-run effect because the spread is stationary. The long run is deﬁned as the
period over which trend relationships emerge. In the long run the funds rate spread (NFR− ˙ p) is
constant.
12 In estimated short-run regressions the coefﬁcients that appear on lagged differences of the
bond rate are very small. If we ignore those coefﬁcients, then the short-run equation (c) given in
footnote 11 can be expressed as
BRt =
−λ1a1
1 − (1 + λ1)L
˙ pt−1 +
λ2
1 − (1 + λ1)L
(NFR − ˙ p)t−1 + other terms,
where L is the lag operator and where λ2 is −λ1a2. The coefﬁcients (wi) that appear on lagged
levels of NFR − ˙ p are then of the form λ2,λ2(1 + λ1), λ2(1 + λ1)2, etc. The mean lag then can
be calculated as follows:38 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
If we focus on subsample results, it can be seen that all key coefﬁcients
still appear with expected signs and are statistically different from zero. How-
ever, there are some major differences between pre- and post-1979 regression
estimates. In pre-1979 cointegrating regressions the hypotheses that a1 = 1
and b1 = 1 are generally rejected. In contrast, that is not the case in most
post-1979 regressions. The rejection, however, is more common in the Fisher
relation than it is in the Fed reaction function.
In pre-1979 error-correction regressions the bond rate does respond to the
funds rate spread—the one-period response (λ2) ranges from 11 to 23 basis
points. But the one-period response is generally quite close to the near-term net
response (−λ2/λ1), indicating that the effect of policy actions on the bond rate
did not persist too long. In post-1979 error-correction regressions, however,
the near-term response of the bond rate to the funds rate spread is larger than
the one-period lagged response. In particular, the immediate response of the
bond rate to the funds rate ranges from 13 to 16 basis points and the near-term
response from 36 to 48 basis points. Together these estimates imply that the
near-term response of the bond rate to the funds rate spread has increased since
1979.13 I argue below that these different results may be due in part to the way
the Fed has conducted its monetary policy since 1979. In particular, I focus on
the Fed’s disinﬂation policy.
Before 1979 the Fed did not aggressively attempt to bring down the trend
rate of inﬂation. In the long-run Fed reaction function estimated over 1961Q2
to 1979Q3, the parameter b1 is less than unity, indicating that the Fed did not
adjust the funds rate one-for-one with inﬂation (see Table 2). Moreover, the
short-run reaction functions estimated in Mehra (1996) also indicate that in the
pre-1979 period the Fed did not respond to accelerations in actual inﬂation.
Hence, during this early period a monetary policy tightening measured by a
widening in the funds rate spread may have affected the bond rate primarily
by altering its expected real rate component. Because the funds rate increase
alters only near-term expectations of future short real rates, its impact on the
bond rate is likely to be modest, as conﬁrmed by low estimates of λ2 in Table
2. When the bond rate rises above the current inﬂation rate, both the bond
rate and actual inﬂation rises, speeding up the adjustment, as conﬁrmed by








λ2[1 + 2(1 + λ1) + 3(1 + λ1)2 + 4(1 + λ1)3 + . . . ∞]
λ2[1 + (1 + λ1)2 + (1 + λ1)3 + . . . ∞]
= λ2
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13 This is conﬁrmed by results of the formal Chow test that is discussed in the next subsection.Y. P. Mehra: Monetary Policy and Long-Term Interest Rates 39









λ λ2(˜ t) λ λ1(˜ t) −λ λ2/λ λ1
Mean Lag
in Quarters a1(˜ t) b1(˜ t)
1995Q2 0.13(2.7) −0.31(4.8) 0.42 3.2 0.93(10.0) 1.10 (6.0)
1994 0.12(2.4) −0.29(4.5) 0.41 3.4 0.93(10.1) 1.10 (6.2)
1992 0.14(2.6) −0.30(4.5) 0.46 3.3 0.92 (9.7) 1.10 (6.5)
1990 0.15(2.6) −0.31(4.3) 0.47 3.3 0.92 (9.8) 1.10 (6.7)
1988 0.14(2.4) −0.30(4.1) 0.48 3.3 0.94(10.9) 1.00 (6.6)
1986 0.16(2.7) −0.34(2.7) 0.48 2.9 0.94(10.8) 1.10 (6.9)
1984 0.13(1.9) −0.30(2.6) 0.46 3.3 0.93(11.1) 1.10 (6.7)
1982 0.19(2.5) −0.54(3.6) 0.36 1.8 0.76(17.1)c 0.84 (7.6)
1980 0.18(2.1) −0.71(2.2) 0.26 1.4 0.68(30.8)c 0.60 (5.6)c
1979Q3 0.17(3.1) −0.67(3.3) 0.25 1.5 0.69(31.1)c 0.77 (8.9)c
1978 0.16(2.8) −0.64(3.1) 0.26 1.5 0.71(28.4)c 0.78 (9.9)c
1976 0.17(3.2) −0.65(3.0) 0.26 1.5 0.71(21.4)c 1.00(15.9)
1974 0.23(2.9) −0.98(3.6) 0.23 1.0 0.78(17.9)c 0.97(14.6)
1972 0.11(1.2) −0.75(2.6) 0.14 1.3 0.73 (6.9)c 0.68 (2.5)
c indicates the relevant coefﬁcient (a1 or b1) is signiﬁcantly different from unity.
Notes: The coefﬁcients reported above are from the following regressions:
BRt = a0 + a1˙ pt + U1t, (a)
NFRt = b0 + b1˙ pt + U2t, and (b)













d4s gapht−s + ²t, (c)
where gaph is the output gap and other variables are deﬁned as in Table A1. Equations (a) and (b)
are estimated by the dynamic OLS procedure given in Stock and Watson (1993) and equation (c) by
ordinary least squares. The estimation period begins in 1961Q2 and ends as shown in the ﬁrst column.
˜ t is the t-statistic. The mean lag is calculated as −1/λ1.
the bond rate dissipates quickly and hence the near-term effect is close to the
immediate impact.
In the post-1979 period, however, the Fed made a serious attempt to bring
down the trend rate of inﬂation and to contain inﬂationary expectations. The
descriptive analysis of monetary policy in Goodfriend (1993) and the short-run
reaction function estimated in Mehra (1996) are consistent with this obser-
vation. Hence short-run increases in the funds rate spread may also have40 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
affected the bond rate by altering the long-term expected inﬂation. If the Fed’s
disinﬂation policy had been credible, then increases in the funds rate spread
that raise the bond rate’s real component may also lower expectations of the
long-term expected inﬂation rate, thereby offsetting somewhat the immediate
or the very-near-term response of the bond rate to the funds rate spread. The
evidence reported in Table 2, however, indicates that the estimated coefﬁcient
(−λ2/λ1) that measures the near-term response shows no tendency to fall in the
post-1979 period. On the other hand, if the public does not have full conﬁdence
in the Fed’s disinﬂation policy and if the Fed has to persist with sufﬁciently
high short real rates to reduce the trend rate of inﬂation or contain inﬂationary
expectations, then the estimated effect of a policy action on the bond rate would
last longer. In this case, the near-term effect of the funds rate spread on the
bond rate would be larger and the mean lag in the effect of such policy on
the bond rate would also be higher. Both these implications are consistent with
results in Table 2, where both the estimated short-run effect (−λ2/λ1) and the
mean lag (−1/λ1) are higher in the post-1979 period than they were in the
period before.
Additional Empirical Results
In this section I discuss and report some additional test results which conﬁrm
the robustness of conclusions reached in the previous section. I consider several
changes in the speciﬁcation of the short-run equation (10). First, I reproduce the
empirical work in Table 2 under the alternative speciﬁcation that the short-run
stance of monetary policy is measured by the real funds rate. I then consider
additional changes in speciﬁcation to address concerns raised by the potential
endogeneity of monetary policy actions, alternative measures of inﬂation, and
the potential stationarity of data. For these latter experiments I focus on results
that pertain to the short-run effect of the funds rate on the bond rate over
two sample periods only, 1961Q1 to 1995Q2 and 1961Q2 to 1979Q3. Hence I
report two key coefﬁcients, λ2 and (−λ2/λ1).
The results in Table 2 discussed in the previous section use the residual
from the long-run Fed reaction function as a measure of the short-run stance
of monetary policy. I now examine results if the short-run stance of policy is
measured instead by the real funds rate (NFR−˙ p). Furthermore, I now estimate
the Fisher relation (8) jointly with the short-run error-correction equation. This
procedure allows for richer short-run dynamics in estimating the long-run effect
of inﬂation on the bond rate. The short-run equation that incorporates these two
new changes can be derived by replacing the residuals U1t−1 and U2t−1 in (10)
by lagged levels of the variables and then by setting b1 = 1. The resulting
short-run equation isY. P. Mehra: Monetary Policy and Long-Term Interest Rates 41










d3s∆(NFR − ˙ p)t−s +
n X
s=1
d4s gapht−s + ²t, (11)
where λ3 = −λ1a1. In (11), if a1 = 1, then the coefﬁcients on BRt−1 and
˙ pt−1 sum to zero (λ1 + λ3 = 0 in (11)). I impose this restriction only if it is
not rejected. Table 3 reports some key coefﬁcients (λ1,λ2,−λ2/λ1,λ3). These
estimated coefﬁcients conﬁrm the qualitative nature of results in Table 2. First,
the real funds rate is a signiﬁcant predictor of the bond rate and this result
Table 3 Short-Run Error-Correction Regressions Using the
Level of the Funds Rate Spread
Estimation
Ends
in Year λ λ2(˜ t) λ λ1(˜ t) −λ λ2/λ λ1
Mean Lag
in
Quarters λ λ3(˜ t ) −λ λ3/λ λ1 F1
1995Q2 0.12(2.6) −0.29(4.7) 0.40 3.5 0.29(4.7) 1.00 0.89
1994 0.10(2.2) −0.26(4.3) 0.35 3.8 0.26(4.3) 1.00 0.89
1992 0.11(2.4) −0.28(4.4) 0.39 3.6 0.28(4.4) 1.00 0.64
1990 0.11(2.2) −0.28(4.1) 0.39 3.6 0.28(4.1) 1.00 0.68
1988 0.11(2.2) −0.27(3.9) 0.41 3.7 0.27(3.9) 1.00 0.63
1986 0.13(2.5) −0.30(4.2) 0.41 3.2 0.30(4.2) 1.00 0.55
1984 0.10(1.7) −0.22(2.3) 0.41 4.5 0.22(2.3) 1.00 0.11
1982 0.21(3.4) −0.53(3.5) 0.40 1.9 0.48(3.5) 0.90 3.70∗
1980 0.12(1.9) −0.24(2.0) 0.50 4.2 0.24(2.0) 1.00 1.00
1979Q3 0.13(2.5) −0.41(2.4) 0.31 2.4 0.32(2.5) 0.80 3.60∗
1978 0.12(2.4) −0.41(2.3) 0.29 2.4 0.32(2.3) 0.78 3.40∗
1976 0.14(2.6) −0.53(2.6) 0.26 1.9 0.39(2.5) 0.74 6.60∗∗
1974 0.22(3.1) −0.92(3.8) 0.23 1.1 0.67(3.7) 0.73 14.20∗∗
1972 0.21(2.3) −0.97(3.4) 0.22 1.0 0.69(3.3) 0.71 10.10∗∗
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Notes: The coefﬁcients reported are from regressions of the form







d2s ∆˙ pt−s +
2 X
s=1




where gaph is the output gap and other variables are as deﬁned in Table A1. All regressions are estimated
by ordinary least squares. The estimation period begins in 1961Q2 and ends in the year shown. The
mean lag is calculated as −1/λ1. ˜ t is the t-statistic. F1 tests the null hypotheses that λ1 and λ3 sum to
zero, indicating that the Fisher restriction is consistent with data.42 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
is fairly robust over several subsamples. Second, the Chow test indicates that
two key parameters, λ1 and λ2, are unstable only between pre- and post-1979
periods (the date of the break is 1980Q2). This result is consistent with an
increase in the near-term effect of policy on the bond rate in the post-1979
period.
The short-run error-correction equation (11) was alternatively re-estimated
using the consumer price index and the GDP deﬂator to measure inﬂation, that
is, the average inﬂation rate over the past three years. As in a few previous
studies, I also used the Livingston survey data on one-year-ahead inﬂationary
expectations. The results continue to indicate that the funds rate spread gener-
ally does help predict the bond rate and that the near-term response of the bond
rate to the funds rate spread has increased since 1979 (see rows 1 through 3 in
Table 4).14
The funds rate spread here measures the short-run stance of monetary pol-
icy because it is that component of the funds rate that does not comove with
inﬂation. This spread, however, is still endogenous because, as noted before,
the Fed routinely raises the funds rate during cyclical expansions and lowers
it during cyclical downturns. The potential problem created by such endogene-
ity is that if the bond rate is directly inﬂuenced by variables that reﬂect the
cyclical state of the economy and if those variables are omitted from short-run
regressions, then the funds rate spread may be picking up the inﬂuence of those
variables on the bond rate rather than the inﬂuence of monetary policy on the
real component of the bond rate.
The short-run regressions reported in Tables 2 and 3 already include many
of those variables such as the output gap that measures the cyclical state of
the economy and changes in inﬂation, the bond rate, and the funds rate spread
itself. While it is difﬁcult to know all the information that the Fed may be
using in setting its short-run funds rate policy, I re-estimated (11) alternatively
including additional variables such as nonfarm payroll employment, sensitive
materials prices, the deﬁcit, and real growth. Those additional variables, when
included in (11), are generally not signiﬁcant and therefore do not change the
qualitative nature of results in Table 3 (see rows 4a through 4d in Table 4).
It is sometimes argued that unit root tests used here have low power in
distinguishing whether the variables are stationary or integrated. Hence the
cointegration and error-correction methodology used here to distinguish be-
tween long- and short-run sources of comovement between the bond rate and
the funds rate is suspect. However, the evidence presented above that the bond
rate and the funds rate adjust one-for-one with inﬂation in the long run is con-
ﬁrmed even if I treat the bond rate, the funds rate, and inﬂation as stationary
14 When inﬂation is measured by the behavior of the consumer price index or the Livingston
survey, I get some mixed results. The statistical signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient that appears on the
funds rate spread is not robust over different sample periods.Table 4 Sensitivity to Changes in Speciﬁcation
Changes in Speciﬁcation Panel A: 1961Q2–1995Q2 Panel B: 1961Q2–1979Q3
λ λ2(˜ t) (−λ λ2/λ λ1) f2 ˜ f2 λ λ2(˜ t) (−λ λ2/λ λ1) f2 ˜ f2
1. CPI 0.08(1.7) 0.42 0.09(1.6) 0.16
2. GDP Deﬂator 0.11(2.2) 0.49 0.10(2.0) 0.19
3. Livingston Survey 0.08(1.7) 0.35 0.07(1.6) 0.23
4. CPIEXFE
Additional Variables
a. ∆lnPEM 0.14(2.9) 0.48 0.15(2.8) 0.35
b. dt 0.10(2.3) 0.37 0.13(2.0) 0.28
c. ∆lnSMP 0.10(2.4) 0.38 0.13(2.5) 0.29
d. ∆lnryt 0.12(2.5) 0.43 0.10(1.5) 0.25
5. Stationary: Level
Regressions 0.07(1.9) 0.42 0.09(2.1) 0.29
Notes: The coefﬁcients reported are from regressions of the form given in Table 3. The Fisher restriction is imposed in regressions estimated
over 1961Q2–1995Q2 but not in those estimated over 1961Q2 to 1979Q3. CPI is the consumer price index; CPIEXFE is the consumer
price index excluding food and energy; PEM is the nonfarm payroll employment; ∆lnry is real GDP growth; d is federal government
deﬁcits scaled by nominal GDP, and SMP is the sensitive materials prices. The coefﬁcients reported in the row labeled 5 are from the
regression (14) of the text. f2 is the coefﬁcient that measures the contemporary response of the bond rate to the funds rate spread and ˜ f2
the near-term.44 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
variables. The stationary versions of the long-run regressions (8) and (9) can
be expressed as in (12) and (13):
BRt = a0 +
n X
s=0
a1s ˙ pt−s +
n X
s=1
a2s BRt−s + U1t (12)
NFRt = b0 +
n X
s=0
b1s ˙ pt−s +
n X
s=1
b2s NFRt−s + U2t. (13)





















. One cannot reject the hypotheses that
these net responses each are unity. As for short-run correlations, consider the
following stationary version of the short-run equation:
BRt = f0 + f1˙ pt + f2 (NFR − ˙ p)t + f3 gapht +
n X
s=1
f4s BRt−s + ²t, (14)
where all variables are as deﬁned before. Equation (14) already incorporates
the long-run restriction that short-run funds rate policy actions affect the bond
rate by altering the spread between the funds rate and the inﬂation rate. The
other restriction can be imposed by the requirement that coefﬁcients f1 and
n P
s=1
f4s in (14) sum to unity. The parameter f2 in (14) measures the contempo-
raneous response of the bond rate to the funds rate spread and its net response










I estimate equation (14) by instrumental variables that are just lagged
values of the right-hand side explanatory variables. In such regressions the
funds rate spread still helps predict the bond rate (see row 5 in Table 4).
A Comparison with Some Previous Studies
In this section I discuss some previous studies that use entirely different method-
ologies but reach conclusions regarding the short-run impact of policy on
long-term rates which are qualitatively similar to those reported here.
The ﬁrst set consists of studies by Cook and Hahn (1989), Radecki and
Reinhart (1994), and Roley and Sellon (1995). All three of these studies ex-
amine the response of long-term interest rates to changes in a measure of the
federal funds rate target. They differ, however, with respect to the sample period
studied and the length of the interval over which the interest rate response is
measured. In Cook and Hahn the sample period studied is September 1974
to September 1979 and the interest rate response is measured on the day of
the target change. In the other two studies the sample periods examined fallY. P. Mehra: Monetary Policy and Long-Term Interest Rates 45
within the post-1979 period: 1989 to 1993 in Radecki and Reinhart (1994)
and October 1987 to July 1995 in Roley and Sellon (1995). The measurement
interval in Radecki and Reinhart spans the ﬁrst ten days following the policy
change, whereas in Roley and Sellon the time interval spans the period from
the day after the previous policy action to the day after the current policy
action. The economic rationale for the use of a wider measurement interval as
in Roley and Sellon is that many times monetary policy actions are already
anticipated by the markets, so that long-term interest rates move ahead of the
announced change in the funds rate target. The relative magnitudes of interest
rate responses before, during, and after the policy action, however, depend upon
whether policy actions are anticipated or unanticipated and upon the degree of
persistence in anticipated policy actions.
The measurement interval is the narrowest in Cook and Hahn and Radecki
and Reinhart; the results there indicate that a one percentage point increase in
the funds rate target induces 12 to 13 basis points movement in the ten-year
bond rate (increases in longer maturity bond rates are somewhat smaller). The
size of the interest rate response during and after the change in policy action
as measured by Roley and Sellon is also modest; the 30-year Treasury bond
yield rises by 10 basis points following one percentage point increase in the
effective federal funds rate target. However, when the measurement interval
includes days before the change in policy action, the measured interest rate
response rises to 38 basis points. Thus a signiﬁcant part of the response occurs
before policy action is announced, indicating the presence of anticipated effect.
What needs to be noted is that the magnitude of the total interest rate response
measured by Roley and Sellon is quite close to the near-term response that I
have estimated using an entirely different estimation methodology. Recall that
for the complete sample period 1961Q2 to 1995Q2 the estimated near-term
response of the ten-year bond rate to the funds rate spread is 42 basis points
(see Table 2). The estimated near-term response is 36 basis points if instead I
use the 30-year bond yield in my empirical work.
The other recent study showing that in the short run the long real rate
comoves with the short nominal rate is by Fuhrer and Moore (1995). Accord-
ing to the expectational theory of the term structure of interest rates, the ex
ante long-term real rate can be viewed as a weighted moving average of future
short real rates. Fuhrer and Moore deﬁne the short real rate as the nominal
yield on three-month Treasury bills minus the actual quarterly inﬂation rate.
They then use a vector autoregression to construct long-horizon forecasts of the
time paths of the three-month Treasury bill rate and the inﬂation rate. Given
those forecasts they compute the 40-quarter-duration long-term real rate, since
the average duration (maturity) of Moody’s BAA corporate bond rate is 40
quarters. What they ﬁnd is that over the period 1965 to 1992 the sample path
of the ex ante long real rate tracks closely that of the short-term nominal rate
(Fuhrer and Moore 1995, Figure 1, p. 224). The ex ante long real rate is still46 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
relatively stable, however, and only about one-fourth of the increase in the
short nominal rate is reﬂected in the long real rate.
3. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This article has investigated empirically the immediate, near-term, and long-
run effects of monetary policy on the bond rate. The federal funds rate is used
as a measure of monetary policy, and the long run is viewed as the period
during which trend relationships emerge. The results indicate that the long-
run effect of monetary policy on the bond rate occurs primarily through the
inﬂation channel.
In the short run, however, monetary policy also affects the bond rate by
altering its expected real rate component. The short-run stance of monetary
policy is measured by the spread between the funds rate and the ongoing trend
rate of inﬂation. The results indicate that the near-term effect of the funds rate
spread on the bond rate has increased considerably since 1979. In the pre-1979
period, the bond rate rose anywhere from 14 to 29 basis points whenever the
funds rate spread widened by one percentage point. In the post-1979 period,
however, the estimate of its near-term response ranges from 26 to 50 basis
points.
This increase in the short-run sensitivity of the bond rate to monetary policy
actions is consistent with the way the Fed has conducted its monetary policy
since 1979. Since then the Fed has made a serious attempt to bring down the
trend rate of inﬂation and contain inﬂationary expectations. If the public does
not have full conﬁdence in the Fed’s disinﬂation policy, and if the Fed has to
persist with sufﬁciently high short real rates to reduce the trend rate of inﬂation
or contain inﬂationary expectations, then the estimated effect of a policy action
on the bond rate would last longer. As a result, the near-term effect of policy
on the bond rate would be stronger than would be the case if the disinﬂation
policy were fully credible.
APPENDIX A
The stationarity properties of data are investigated using both unit roots and
mean stationarity tests. The test for unit roots used is the augmented Dickey-
Fuller test and the one for mean stationarity is the one in Kwiatkowski et al.
(1992). Both these tests are described in Mehra (1994).
Table A1 presents test results for determining whether the variables BR, ˙ p,
NFR, BR − ˙ p and NFR − ˙ p have a unit root or are mean stationary. As can beY. P. Mehra: Monetary Policy and Long-Term Interest Rates 47
Table A1 Tests for Unit Roots and Mean Stationarity
Series
Panel A
Tests for Unit Roots
Panel B
Tests for Mean Stationarity
X ˆ ρ ρ t ˆ ρ ρ k ˆ nu
BR 0.96 −1.7 5 0.83∗
˙ p 0.99 −2.0 1 0.56∗
NFR 0.89 −2.9a 5 0.46a
BR − ˙ p 0.87 −3.2∗ 3 0.04
NFR − ˙ p 0.70 −5.0∗ 5 0.03
∆BR −0.10 −5.6∗ 4 0.19
∆˙ p 0.60 −4.3∗ 7 0.18
∆NFR −0.30 −4.9∗ 7 0.07
aThe test statistic is close to the relevant 5 percent critical value.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Notes: BR is the ten-year Treasury bond rate; ˙ p is the average inﬂation rate over the past three
years; and NFR is the nominal funds rate. ∆ is the ﬁrst difference operator. Inﬂation is measured
by the behavior of the consumer price index excluding food and energy. This price series begins
in 1957; therefore the effective sample period studied is 1960Q1 to 1995Q2. The values for ρ and
t-statistics (t ˆ ρ) for ρ = 1 in panel A above are from the augmented Dickey-Fuller regressions of
the form




where X is the pertinent series. The number of lagged ﬁrst differences (k) included in these
regressions are chosen using the procedure given in Hall (1990). The procedure starts with some
upper bound on k, say k max chosen a priori (eight quarters here). Estimate (a) above with k set
at k max. If the last included lag is signiﬁcant, select k = k max. If not, reduce the order of the
autoregression by one until the coefﬁcient on the last included lag is signiﬁcant. The test statistic
ˆ nu in panel B above is the statistic that tests the null hypothesis that the pertinent series is mean
stationary. The 5 percent critical value for ˆ nu given in Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) is 0.463 and for
t ˆ ρ given in Fuller (1976) is −2.89.
seen, the t-statistic (t ˆ ρ) that tests the null hypothesis that a particular variable
has a unit root is small for BR, ˙ p, and NFR, but large for BR− ˙ p and NFR− ˙ p.
On the other hand, the test statistics (ˆ nu) that tests the null hypothesis that a
particular variable is mean stationary is large for BR, ˙ p, and NFR, but small for
BR − ˙ p and NFR − ˙ p. These results indicate that BR, ˙ p, and NFR have a unit
root and are thus nonstationary in levels. In contrast BR − ˙ p and NFR − ˙ p do
not have a unit root and are thus stationary in levels. Table A1 also presents
unit roots and mean stationary tests using ﬁrst differences of BR, ˙ p, and NFR.
As can be seen, the test results indicate that ﬁrst differences of these variables
are stationary.48 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The test for cointegration used is the one proposed in Johansen and Juselius
(1990). The test procedure is described in Mehra (1994). Two test statistics—the
trace test and the maximum eigenvalue test—are used to evaluate the number
of cointegrating relationships. Table A2 presents these two test statistics for de-
termining whether in bivariable systems like (BR, ˙ p), (BR,NFR) and (NFR, ˙ p)
there exist a cointegrating vector. Those test results are consistent with the
presence of cointegration between variables in each system.




(BR, ˙ p) 16.2∗ 11.3 8
(BR,NFR) 36.4∗ 32.5∗ 6
(NFR, ˙ p) 22.3∗ 17.1∗ 8
∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Notes: Trace and maximum eigenvalue tests are tests of the null hypothesis that there is no coin-
tegrating relation in the system. The test used for cointegration is the one proposed on Johansen
and Juselius (1990). The lag length in the relevant VAR system is k and is chosen using the
likelihood ratio test given in Sims (1980). In particular, the VAR model initially was estimated
k set equal to a maximum number of eight quarters. This unrestricted model was then tested
against a restricted model, where k is reduced by one, using the likelihood ratio test. The lag
length ﬁnally selected is the one that results in the rejection of the restricted model.
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